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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Taipei 964

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JOINT STATE-AID-DEFENSE MESSAGE

Reference: DEPCIRTEL 1918

Following is summary Country Team report and recommendations on possible police training program:

I.A. principal police organs are Taiwan Provincial Police Administration (TPPA) with some 27,000 employees; Taiwan Garrison General HQ (TGGH), a military organization controlling several police regiments and MP battalions, many secret agents, and one regular Infantry Division; and Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, comparable to FBI with staff of several hundred.

B. All three organs by US standards are poorly equipped. US aid to GRC armed forces has permitted GRC use own resources and older equipment for TPPA and TGGH. Regular division under TGGH is rotated and is well equipped "forward look" unit. MP units also well-equipped.

C. TPPA has normal police functions. Focus of TGGH operations is internal security under state of martial law which has continued since GRC's withdrawal here. Distinction between responsibilities of two organs often unclear. MJIB is investigative organ, paralleling some of TGGH operations. Although methods often wasteful, and sometimes clumsy, and heavy-handed, even brutal, all three organs are clearly able perform functions of maintaining peace and order and rooting out subversion. Some of low level personnel, especially Taiwanese, not warm supporters of GRC but there can be no question of loyalty of middle and high ranking officers, all mainlanders.

D. Chief

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D. Chief organizational deficiency is overlapping and confusion of functions among agencies. Each is itself rather well set up. All have serious training deficiencies which compel use of obsolete methods for lack of modern know-how and procedures. Deficiencies do not however prevent accomplishment of primary missions.

II. In past TPPA has indicated interest in US aid but GRC has never put forward request. There are indications higher authorities may now be more willing see US advisors working with police and security agencies in some areas and certainly GRC would not object to provision of more modern equipment. Doubtful, however, that security officials would welcome or be willing accept new ways of doing things. Downward adjustment force levels would be strenuously resisted.

III. While security organizations in Taiwan would benefit from modernization, we do not now recommend attempting institute broad US assistance program to this end for following reasons: (A) Communist subversive efforts here appear to be effectively dealt with by present police system which we believe can contain foreseeable threats to peace and order. (B) We do not believe GC would request or welcome US advice regarding most important and sensitive areas its security system. (C) Security system is to considerable extent directed toward preventing Taiwanese political activity and we do not believe it desirable for US to become too closely associated in minds of Taiwanese with repressive measures of GRC.

However some areas may still offer scope for US activity. Traffic control is becoming serious problem..police clearly at a loss how to handle. Occasional visits by US experts have not provided sustained guidance and follow-through which are needed. CT recommends assignment expert this field to develop program, including provision some badly needed equipment. Second area worth considering would be assignment US expert to police college to guide TPPA toward more modern

modern methods. Flash estimate of program valid until conditions change would this be two US technicians and some $200,000 per year in training and equipment expenses. Full report follows.

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